


Ciudad de México, 11 de noviembre de 2019.

H. MIEMBROS DEL CONSEJO DIVISIONAL
DIVISIÓN DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES Y HUMANIDADES
UAM CUAJIMALPA
PRESENTES



Con fundamento en el artículo 231 del RIPPPA, me permito presentar a ustedes el informe de mi período sabático 2018-2019. Primeramente, cabe señalar que el Consejo Divisional en su sesión CDCSH.160.18, celebrada el 9 de mayo de 2018, aprobó el disfrute de dicho período sabático bajo el Acuerdo DCSH.CD.03.160.18. Posteriormente, sometí a consideración del mismo Consejo la aprobación de un *addendum* al plan de trabajo originalmente presentado, señalando mi intención de continuar las asesorías de tesis y proyectos terminales de los alumnos de la División de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades. Dicha modificación fue aprobada por el Consejo Divisional en su sesión DCSH.CD.07.169.19, celebrada el 13 de mayo de 2019. Finalmente, debido al prolongado período de huelga por el que atravesó la Universidad, solicité la reposición de 93 días naturales –correspondientes a la duración de la huelga– para ser acumulados en mi próxima solicitud de año o período sabático, esta última solicitud fue aprobada por el Consejo Divisional en su sesión DCSH.CD.171.19 celebrada el 13 de junio de 2019, bajo el Acuerdo DCSH.CD.13.171.19.

Un objetivo esencial de mi proyecto de sabático lo representaba el poder sintetizar en un producto publicable los resultados del proyecto de investigación titulado “*Diversidad Institucional de la gestión del agua en México: definición de reglas y acción pública*”, el cual concluyó en 2018. Este objetivo logró concretarse en el artículo titulado *Politics and policy: power and performativity in Mexican water*

management (Anexo 1), el cual fue sometido a la revista *Organization Studies* para su publicación. Desafortunadamente, en octubre pasado se me notificó que el artículo no fue aceptado, por lo que actualmente se valoran otras publicaciones internacionales a las cuales someter el texto.

Otro objetivo importante a desarrollar en este período sabático era realizar una estancia de investigación, durante los meses de enero a abril de 2019, en Francia, la U. de Guanajuato o el CIDE Región Centro. Sin embargo, me encontraba afinando la planeación para la estancia en Francia con el Dr. Salomón González Arellano cuando estalló la huelga, por lo que esta opción quedó descartada, como en su momento lo informé al Jefe del Departamento de Estudios Institucionales vía correo electrónico (Anexo 2, correo del 21 de febrero de 2019).

Con la finalidad de cumplir en lo posible con mi plan de trabajo y a pesar de que durante la huelga no era posible gestionar el financiamiento por parte de la UAM, mantuve el contacto con los colegas de las instituciones estatales arriba mencionadas. El director de la DCSH de la U. de Guanajuato campus León (Dr. Alex Caldera) y el Director de la sede Región Centro del CIDE (Dr. Jaime Sáinz) amablemente ofrecieron cubrir mi estancia, aunque en un periodo corto de tres semanas, del 12 al 31 de mayo de 2019 (Anexos 3 y 4, correos del 29 de abril y 14 de mayo de 2019). La estancia en dichas instituciones permitió desarrollar las siguientes actividades:

1. Participación en el Taller "Hacia una agenda sobre la investigación social del agua en la región Centro-Occidente, con la participación del Dr. Esteban Castro (Newcastle University), el Dr. Alex Caldera (Universidad de Guanajuato), el Dr. Richard Woodward (Texas A&M University), el Dr. Peter Knappett (Texas A&M University), el Dr. Jaime Sáinz (CIDE) y el Dr. Raúl Pacheco Vega (CIDE). En este taller se exploraron posibilidades de colaboración con estas instituciones para desarrollar investigación concerniente a problemas relacionados con la gestión del agua. Un punto a

destacar es la posibilidad de retomar el tema la concesión de Aguascalientes, que finalizaría en el año 2020, para desarrollar un seminario conjunto entre el CIDE, la U. de Guanajuato y la UAM, ya que los Doctores Caldera, Pacheco y una servidora hemos publicado en diferentes momentos sobre este caso que representa la primera concesión del servicio urbano del agua en México. Se anexan documentos probatorios (Anexos 5 y 6).

2. Participación en seminario en el CIDE Región Centro, dentro del proyecto "Entendiendo y resolviendo conflictos por el agua en México", el jueves 23 de mayo de 2019. En este seminario presenté el artículo arriba citado, titulado *Politics and policy: power and performativity in Mexican water management*, el cual fue discutido con colegas del CIDE y alumnos de nivel Maestría. Se anexan documentos probatorios (Anexos 7, 8 y 9).
3. Participación en el Coloquio "Retos socio-políticos de la gestión del agua ante modelos de desarrollo extractivistas en México y América Latina", organizado por la Universidad de Guanajuato, Campus León y la Red Waterlat Gobacit. Asistí a los dos días que duró el evento, participando el día viernes 17 de mayo en la mesa *Desigualdades en el acceso al agua (urbana y rural)*, se anexa la constancia correspondiente (Anexo 10). Cabe señalar que la Red Waterlat Gobacit es una red inter y transdisciplinaria enfocada a la docencia y la investigación en torno a la gestión del agua, fue creada en la última década del siglo XX e incluye 10 áreas temáticas relacionadas con el agua. Para mayor información, puede consultarse su sitio web en: <http://waterlat.org/es/>


Finalmente, cabe señalar que el resto de la estancia pudo continuarse en el mes de junio, una vez concluida la huelga y con apoyo del Departamento de Estudios Institucionales. Para dar inicio al trabajo de campo relacionado con el proyecto de investigación titulado "*Ciudadanos y gestión del agua: participar más allá del*

clientelismo", se realizaron entrevistas en León y Aguascalientes. En el primer caso, con funcionarios locales del organismo de agua denominado Sapal; en el segundo caso, con funcionarios municipales del agua y con el director de la empresa concesionaria actualmente conocida como Veolia. Una de las entrevistas realizadas en Aguascalientes se puede ver en el siguiente enlace: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qhKDRadMiOI>. Esta entrevista se hizo en conjunto con el Dr. Esteban Castro de la Red Waterlat Gobacit, el entrevistado fue el Ing. Víctor Parada, antiguo funcionario estatal del agua y actual consultor en la materia. Las otras entrevistas fueron grabadas, por lo que solamente se cuenta con audio.

Agradeciendo su atención al presente informe, aprovecho la ocasión para enviarles cordiales saludos.

ATENTAMENTE

"Casa abierta al tiempo"



Dra. María de Lourdes Amaya Ventura
Profesora Investigadora
Departamento de Estudios Institucionales

Politics and policy: power and performativity in Mexican water management

Introduction

For a long time, water supply was considered a technical problem, one that could only be solved through solutions provided by engineering. Nowadays it is recognized that water supply is also a social and political problem, since cooperation and coordination of governmental and non-governmental actors is required in order to have an efficient and sustainable management system. An international water crisis has been announced for the near future that will impact differently every nation according to the region of the world where it is located. However a general consensus is that non-developed countries will be amongst the most affected. At the same time, local communities inside each nation are facing particular challenges concerning water, a condition that will continue and even could be stressed in the same near future. It is fair to say that water issues are not only a matter of national security, but also a question of domestic stability. In a federal system, coordinated actions around water should be a major priority for governmental authorities and it should also be clear the need for integrating social actors in order to face the multiple challenges posed by water management.

In this scenario, it is relevant to analyze the socio-political conditions for cooperation and collaboration prevailing on each society. In this paper, we develop an analysis of the context surrounding water management in Mexico according to the following

1
2
3 research question: which are the most relevant political and social elements
4 influencing water management and how do they relate to the performativity of local
5 water utilities? We propose some answers based on research results from reviewing
6 some cases of both public and private local water systems. The aim is to identify
7 critical situations involving negotiation, social participation and coordination;
8 characterizing the strategies adopted by the main actors and assessing the final
9 outcomes. The analysis is mainly based in interviews with some of the central actors
10 of those local water systems in Mexico. We consider that outlining the social and
11 political factors on this subject is a first step to recognize that even the more accurate
12 technical solution for water supply problems could fail if we insist in "depoliticize" the
13 discussion about water. The recognition of the interweaving between power issues
14 and performativity inside Mexican local water systems is necessary in order to
15 construct efficient strategies to deal with current and future water problems.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

36
37 In Mexico, several recent experiences have shown that even the more efficient
38 technical solution for water issues could be blocked by political interests, power
39 issues or social conflicts. This is not completely obvious for water managers whom
40 face political intrusion in their ordinary work and feel the frustration of having
41 innovative well studied ideas for improving water management, but find difficulties
42 and oppositions at the moment of implementing them. At the academic sector it is
43 recognized the importance of considering both sides of the problem –politics and
44 policy– the former related to power and the latter concerning efficiency and
45 achievement of goals. The challenge now is to establish a dialogue between water
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 public service and water analysts in order to integrate those political and social
4
5 elements in new water management models. That means a two folded challenge: a
6
7 theoretical issue related to the analysis of the dynamic processes involving politics
8
9 and policy on water issues and an empirical goal of articulating power relationships
10
11 with management performativity.
12
13
14
15
16
17

18 After a review of several local management systems we have identified specific local
19
20 issues on water management as well as three general subjects related to water
21
22 problems. The first relevant subject is about **the notion of water**, for a long time the
23
24 debate turned around the discussion of water as a natural resource versus water as
25
26 a commodity. Based on the Mexican experience, we observe that the focus of this
27
28 discussion should be the opposition of water as a human right (as it has been
29
30 recognized by the United Nations¹) versus water as a political resource. In a speech
31
32 level, water as a human right has been included in the Mexican constitution since
33
34 2012²; in practice, water has been increasingly used as a political resource not only
35
36 for electoral campaigns but also in order to construct or maintain clientelistic
37
38 relationships with different social groups. A second subject is how **the municipal**
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

46
47 ¹ On 2010, through resolution 64/292, the United Nations recognized "the right to safe and clean drinking
48 water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights"
49 (<http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=A/RES/64/292&lang=E>)

50 ² The Article 4 of the Mexican constitution was reformed stating that: "any person has right to access and
51 sanitation of water for personal and domestic use in a sufficient, healthy, acceptable and affordable way. The
52 state will guarantee this human right and the law will establish bases, supports and forms for access and equal
53 and sustainable use of water resources, defining the role of federal government, state authorities and
54 municipalities as well as citizens participation through the pursuit of this goal" (Political Constitution of the
55 United Mexican States, Art. 4).
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 **level has become the most relevant policy arena for water issues**, given the
4
5 specific elements related to water problems in each community, such as water
6
7 availability, demographic evolution, economic activities, governmental budget and
8
9 also the nature of the relationship between governmental authorities and social
10
11 groups. We will find different water systems not only in reference to the management
12
13 model adopted but also concerning the combination of geographical, technical and
14
15 socio-political elements articulating them. A third relevant subject concerns how
16
17 **water management reflects the current state of Mexican political culture.**
18
19 Considering the classic categorization proposed by Almond and Verba (1989),
20
21 political relationships around water resources in Mexico show the difficulties of
22
23 moving from a model of subject culture to a participant model based on a strong
24
25 citizenship³. Since we consider that all environmental policies –including water
26
27 management– are strongly based on the cooperation between government and
28
29 society, the consolidation of a participant culture would be required in order to have
30
31 a more efficient and sustainable water policy.
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

41 In developing our arguments about the social and political factors identified in this
42
43 paper, we will keep in mind these three fundamental subjects of the general context
44
45 for water management in Mexico. Since our focus is on social and political
46
47
48
49

50 ³ In their classic study about civic culture, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1989) identified three pure forms
51 of political culture: parochial culture, subject culture and participant culture. The first one was the most
52 elemental form of political culture, where political and religious orientations are mixed; the second one,
53 where a differentiated political system exists but the individuals relate to it in a general level; finally, the
54 participant political culture is where individuals are explicitly oriented towards the system adopting an activist
55 role, based on citizenship. The authors emphasize that these categories of political culture may appear mixed
56 in real political life.
57

relationships around water, we will adopt a conceptual framework combining elements of the public action approach and the institutional analysis. We will then develop the empirical part of the paper starting with the identification of the local actors involved on water sector, emphasizing urban water management. Then we will list the social and political factors that affect in a more significant way the performativity of local water management systems. We will illustrate each point by specific examples. Finally, we will propose some reflections about the three general subjects we have just mentioned and their relationship with the five elements we will discuss, always within the framework of public action and institutional analysis.

a) Public action and institutions: relevant conceptual elements for understanding water management.

At this point it is necessary to clarify some conceptual elements that will be useful in developing our argument, they are related to public action and institutional analysis. The concept of public action tries to give a better comprehension of how public affairs are handled in contemporary societies in comparison to public policy analysis that focus on governmental action. With significant sociological roots, public action proposes to conceive the treatment of public affairs in terms of collective action constructed by governmental and non-governmental actors linked by clear strong interdependencies. In this sense, there are no dominant actors defining the sense of a public policy, governmental and social spheres complement each other constituting a continuum with several power centers (Duran, 1999; Cabrero, 2005).

We can see that in this approach power is conceived from a relational point of view which exercise is accomplished by specific individuals or groups acting inside specific local frameworks (Friedberg, 1997). The recognition of interdependencies is relevant since all actors have power resources—even if not in the same degree—that can be used depending on the situation that is why we cannot understand power without consideration of those interdependencies. According to Friedberg “there is no power without relationship and there is no relationship without exchange” (Friedberg, 1997, p. 125). Also, it is important to keep in mind that such individual or collective actors do not come exclusively from the governmental structure since public action is co-produced by government and society. In this joint action, a degree of flexibility is required in order to construct coordination mechanisms corresponding to particular situations and resources of each territory. Thus, the public action approach is a territorial one (Duran, 1999), and it is clearly pertinent and useful in order to analyze decentralized public policies which are sensed to favor the emergence of multiple decision making centers, according to the transference of capacities from the national government to the local ones.

Concerning institutional analysis, a first element is the distinction between formal and informal institutions⁴, the former referring to rules as a part of an incentives

⁴ Here we try to synthetize the main ideas of the multiple definitions of institutions provided by different approaches. It is not the purpose of this paper to achieve a definitive definition of this elusive concept, but to take a position useful for the analysis of water issues.

1
2
3 scheme establishing constraints for individual and collective behavior as well as the
4
5 corresponding sanctions in case of disobedience. Formal rules are related with the
6
7 rational choice approach of institutions, conceiving them as "aggregations of rules
8
9 with members of the organizations (...) agreeing to follow those rules in exchange
10
11 for such benefits as they are able to derive from their membership within the
12
13 structure" (Peters, 1999, p. 47). There is a strong rational element in this vision of
14
15 institutions, since their influence in human behavior is the result of an attempt to
16
17 maximize our own utility.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25 On the other hand, informal institutions emerge from social constructions, beliefs
26
27 and roles. Institutions are social norms that prevail and are reproduced among
28
29 generations because they are associated to relevant values for specific societies in
30
31 specific historical periods. Informal institutions are associated to extra-rational,
32
33 symbolic aspects, they are conceived as signification systems related to cognitive
34
35 elements (Peters, 1999). In this case, obedience have more to do with an
36
37 internalization of social norms than with the rational cost-benefit analysis, individuals
38
39 and collectivities agree to follow those norms because they give sense to their social
40
41 reality. In any case, both formal and informal institutions are permanently mixed and
42
43 influencing human behavior at the individual and collective scale.
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51 An important subject of institutional analysis is the question of how do institutions
52
53 change. This subject has been widely discussed in institutional literature, but what
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 we want to outline here is the different rhythms of change among formal and informal
4
5 institutions. North considers institutional change as a complicated process: "Even if
6
7 formal norms can change overnight as a result of political or judiciary decisions,
8
9 informal constraints embedded in custom, traditions and behavior codes are much
10
11 more resistant" (North, 1993, p. 17). In this sense, Roland (2004) established a
12
13 difference between fast-moving institutions (laws) and slow-moving institutions
14
15 (culture). As we stated before, they are permanently influencing human behavior and
16
17 the difference in their evolution often generates social tensions.
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25 A final concept that we want to introduce is the concept of institutional framework, it
26
27 refers to the structure adopted by organizations participating in a specific institutional
28
29 environment (Saleth and Dinar, 2004), as well as the system of formal laws that
30
31 constitute regulation for a public policy. It is within this institutional framework that
32
33 exchanges between actors take place and it is inside this framework that policy
34
35 orientation occurs. As part of the fast-moving institutions, the institutional framework
36
37 of a policy arena can change quickly.
38
39
40
41

42
43
44 All this conceptual elements are useful for the analysis of water management. Given
45
46 its nature as a policy related to a natural resource, water policy requires an
47
48 articulated incorporation of governmental and non-governmental actors. It is also a
49
50 policy embedded in an institutional framework and an institutional environment
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 constituted by formal and informal institutions. Consequently, water management
4
5 cannot escape to the influence of socio-political elements.
6
7
8
9

10
11 In order to integrate this conceptual elements to our analysis of Mexican water
12
13 management we will start by describing the relevant changes in its institutional
14
15 framework after the implementation of a decentralization policy. This description will
16
17 lead us to identify the socio-political elements influencing local water systems in
18
19 Mexico.
20
21

22
23
24
25
26 **b) Institutional framework: actors related to water management in Mexico**
27
28 **on the 21st century.**
29

30
31 The transformation of the institutional framework for water sector in Mexico started
32
33 with the creation of the National Waters Law (LAN by its acronym in Spanish) in
34
35 1992, which introduced a decentralization policy for water issues. Before adopting
36
37 this decentralized model, Mexican water policy was designed following a top-down
38
39 model, there were some local actors but they did not have a relevant role in decision
40
41 making. In general terms, policies and programs were designed and formulated by
42
43 the federal and state governments, while implementation was mainly executed by
44
45 municipal offices. Previous to the LAN, in 1989, the transformation of the water
46
47 sector started with the creation of the National Water Commission (also known as
48
49 Conagua according to its name in Spanish). The relationship scheme that prevailed
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 before the appearance of Conagua and the implementation of a decentralization
4 policy is shown in Figure 1.
5
6

7
8 [Insert Figure 1]
9
10

11
12
13 In this figure we can observe that there were few actors clearly identified by their
14 governmental level. SAHOP makes reference to the federal ministry called Ministry
15 of human settlements and public works, there was no specific ministry charged of
16 water issues so they were managed in the ministry in charge of housing policy.
17
18 Federal boards were the main local water authority, despite their name they were
19 public offices of the state level and in coordination with the General water bureau
20 they controlled the water bureau or department at the municipal level. This general
21 and simple relationship scheme prevailed on water urban sector until the nineties
22 when a decentralization policy was implemented as a part of a new economic model:
23 "It was a political decision, taken by the federal government. Local water authorities
24 were not consulted about the best way of implementing decentralization⁵".
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42 The new National Waters Law (1992) created a total different framework for urban
43 water management. Besides Conagua, which is a federal figure, new regional and
44 local actors were included and the fundamental decision about the management
45 model would be adopted was now on the hands of the municipal authorities. A
46 relevant actor in this new structure are water utilities which can adopt several forms,
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

56 ⁵ Interview water official of the State Commission of Water Supply and Sanitation, Aguascalientes (2012).
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 they can have a municipal or an intermunicipal character, they can be state
4
5 commissions charged of all water systems within a state, finally, they can be private
6
7 utilities regulated by a concession contract. In this new structure we find also regional
8
9 actors such as the Bassin councils created for the different hydrologic-administrative
10
11 regions⁶.
12
13
14
15
16
17

18 As a result, the institutional framework for water management became more
19
20 complex, figures 2 and 3 illustrate two structuration models for water systems
21
22 emerged from the decentralization policy⁷. We can easily observe how the network
23
24 of relationships has increased in complexity. As we pointed out before, it is
25
26 remarkable the presence of the National Water Commission (Conagua); also, we
27
28 can observe that the ministry charged of water issues changed continuously, passing
29
30 from the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources to the current Ministry of
31
32 Environment and Natural Resources (SARH and SEMARNAT respectively, by the
33
34 acronym in spanish). An additional actor at the local level is the State Commission
35
36 for Water Supply and Sanitation, which was created for each state throughout the
37
38 country.
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51 ⁶ In adopting a decentralized model, the Mexican territory was divided in thirteen hydrologic-administrative
52 regions.

53 ⁷ Both structures are shown with the elements identified in the early years of the 21st century in order to
54 emphasize the transformation suffered by local water systems in the early years of decentralization. Since
55 there has not been a major transformation of water sector after this modification, later changes in both local
56 water systems have not significantly altered these structures.
57

Figure 2 represents the water system in San Luis Potosí, a city with an intermunicipal model involving three municipalities (San Luis Potosi, Cerro de San Pedro and Soledad de Graciano Sánchez). Water utility is called Interapas and is subject to relationships with several governmental actor of all scales, from the municipal water council, the water commission of the State Congress and the state commission for water supply and sanitation. In this case, there is also another federal ministry involved on water policy, the Ministry of social development (SEDESOL, by the acronym in Spanish), and its state level office (SEDESORE, by the acronym in Spanish). The dotted lines in some arrows represent occasional and mainly informal relationships between the actors.

[Insert Figure 2]

Figure 3 shows the management model in the case of a concession contract with a private enterprise. The example is the city of Aguascalientes, which was the first city in signing a concession contract for private participation in urban water management.

In a similar way with the Figure 2, in Figure 3 we can see how the participants of the water system have increased. In this case, the enterprise named Proactiva is charged of water management but it is not subject to the multiple relationships that we observed in the case of Interapas, the main relationship of the enterprise is with the municipal office called CCAPAMA (Citizen Council of Water Supply and Sanitation, in Spanish) which is sensed to accomplish regulation functions towards Proactiva. Another state actor related with the enterprise is the COPLADE

(Commission of Planning and Development, in Spanish) a commission of state government charged of urban planning. We can also observe that in this model users are related both with the private enterprise and with the municipal authority, meaning a divided responsibility over water issues.

[Insert Figure 3]

These management models that may appear as an administrative subject, operate in specific social and political contexts, which remind us that water management is a political issue. It should not be surprising, since every policy issue is influenced by political factors all along the public policy process. However, a strong argument has prevailed among academic and public officials concerning the importance of depoliticize the debate about water. We consider that this is an increasingly dangerous position that does not contribute to a better understanding of the needs concerning water management, particularly those related to the development of negotiation capacities in order to allow conciliation between different interests. Given the conditions of increasing scarcity of the resource, negotiation is a relevant challenge for future water policies. In the following section we will review the political and social elements influencing those negotiation capacities and therefore affecting water management.

c) Political and social elements in Mexican water management

We will now discuss the socio-political elements that we have identified as relevant in influencing water management in Mexico, some of them have been made clear

by local conflicts, and some others have been outlined through the analysis of cooperation mechanisms framing water management.

1. A first political issue is **the appointment of water utilities directors**. Most of local water utilities are structured on the base of an administrative council chaired by a general director. Even if every state has its own water law, many of them are similar and establish that those general directors will be in charge for a period of four years. This general director is usually appointed by a local elected official (governor or mayor) or by the administrative council, which in turn is integrated by representatives of civil society and by the major or majors⁸ making part of the local water system. The problem is that most of the times the administrative council is chaired by the mayor or the state governor, so even when it is the administrative council which appoints the general director, local governors or mayors play a key role on decision making. It is pointed out by water public servers that this situation affects the water utility autonomy, since a political compromise emerges because the appointment is seen as a political favor by which the appointee is in debt of loyalty. Even if state laws establish professional requirements for the position of general director, given the relational bases of Mexican political system most of the times the decision is based on the proximity of the candidates to an

⁸ In the case of an intermunicipal management model, several municipalities are integrated on the water utility. For example, in the case of Pachuca, capital of the state of Hidalgo, the water utility includes eleven municipalities; also, in the case of San Luis Potosi, capital of the state with the same name, they are three municipalities covered by the same water utility.

1
2
3 elected official (the governor or the mayor) thus to a political party. In the
4
5 same sense, even if there is no formal compromise of obedience, there is a
6
7 tendency to establish a sponsorship relationship of the kind godfather-
8
9 godson, it is a non-spoken agreement of Mexican political system.
10
11
12
13

14 Among the cases that we have reviewed, we can find the case of the second
15
16 general director of the *intermunicipal* water utility of San Luis Potosi, called
17
18 Interapas. After a first period under the direction of a recognized hydraulic
19
20 engineer, two political parties disputed the final decision of appointing his
21
22 successor. As a result of this dispute, followed a period of incertitude with an
23
24 interim director, breaking the continuity of an efficient first administration. Also
25
26 the general director of ODAPAS, the water utility of Naucalpan, pointed out
27
28 that: "The general director is not appointed by consensus, but by the sacred
29
30 finger of the mayor. The general director is in fact an employee of the local
31
32 mayor"⁹. To illustrate this point, Table 1 shows a brief list of some state laws
33
34 establishing the mechanisms for the appointment of general directors of
35
36 municipal water utilities.
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

56 ⁹ Interview with General Director of OAPAS, Naucalpan water utility, during the period 2009-2013.
57

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

State	Appointment of general director or manager
Aguascalientes	Administrative council of each water utility presided by municipal mayor (Art. 29).
Campeche	Government board of each water utility presided by municipal mayor (Art. 26).
Estado de México	Municipal major (Art. 38)
Oaxaca	Government board of each water utility presided by municipal mayor (Art. 32).
Quintana Roo	Administrative council of each water utility after proposal of the state governor (Art. 26).
San Luis Potosí	Government board of each water utility presided by state governor (Art. 12)
Sinaloa	Administrative council of each water utility presided by municipal mayor (Art. 17).
Sonora	Government board of each water utility presided by municipal mayor (Art. 79).
Veracruz	State governor (Art. 21)
Yucatán	State governor (Art. 8)

Source: Local water laws.

How can a water utility achieve efficiency or improve its performativity when its head depends on political disputes? How can citizens trust in an autonomous decision making capacity on behalf of the water utility authorities? Will the decisions taken by these appointees preserve public interest or privilege political interests of the godfather party? These questions show how closely related to political and specifically power issues could be the technical figure of a water utility director and how different political interest could surround it.

2. There is also a **political use of water rates under a clientelistic model**, since it has been a classical interaction mechanism in Mexican political

1
2
3 system. Politicians and citizens are used to exchange benefits against votes
4
5 on a regular base. Given the increasing difficulties for providing water, it has
6
7 become a political resource, more than a natural one. A resource distributed
8
9 considering power relationships. A clear way in which water is involved on
10
11 those exchanges is the definition of water rates. These rates are generally
12
13 based on the different uses of water: agricultural, domestic, industrial and
14
15 service purposes. When in electoral periods, political campaigns are
16
17 increasingly including water issues with the candidates making promises like
18
19 lower water rates or even the cancellation of water concession contracts with
20
21 private enterprises.
22
23
24
25
26
27

28 On the other hand, several analysis of different rate schemes applied by local
29
30 governments have shown that users of high income are sometimes
31
32 subsidized by users of low income. For example, in Aguascalientes, a study
33
34 made by Zentella compares the average incomes of the population and the
35
36 percentage that they spend on water services. He has observed that users of
37
38 lower income are paying a bigger percentage of water service, since changes
39
40 on water rates are not linked to salary (Zentella, 1999). The amount paid for
41
42 water services can be related to political loyalties or the purpose of
43
44 maintaining privileges for certain social groups linked to economic or political
45
46 local elites. Thus, water rates are often an expression of power relationships
47
48 and not an instrument for achieving efficiency on the activity of the water
49
50 utility.
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

As it was mentioned by the general director of ODAPAS: "Water service has been historically used from a political perspective and not from an economic one, not from the perspective of the service itself, but as an instrument of political manipulation. That is why water rates have always been under real costs"¹⁰. This issue reflects clearly the interweaving between power and performativity on local water systems, since the lack of financial resources is a big constraint for water utilities. How could be controlled the tendency of elected officials to use water as a resource for political exchange so that water rates contribute to a major efficiency on this public service? How can the notion of water as a human right be consolidated within this clientelistic scheme?

3. The strategic lines of water policy since the nineties include citizen participation. However most of the times **citizen participation occurs through a corporatist model**¹¹, given the specific historically constructed characteristics of the relationship between society and State in Mexico. The National Waters Law includes citizen participation as a relevant issue for water policy and at the same line local water laws include forms of citizen representation in the administrative councils of water utilities. Once again, the general director of Naucalpan's water utility points out that "this people are

¹⁰ Interview with General Director of OAPAS, Naucalpan water utility, during the period 2009-2013.

¹¹ It is important to say that in Mexico the notion of corporatism has derived in a particular concept of *corporativism*, meaning a misinterpretation of the original concept where corporations are created and highly controlled by a governmental power. We could then use the term of *corporativistic model*, but for the sake of clarity in this paper, we will maintain the original terms used in English literature.

1
2
3 appointed by the local major, they are not real representatives"¹². Other
4
5 official figures created by this Law, such as the basin councils, were designed
6
7 with the purpose of including citizen representation. However those basin
8
9 councils function at a regional level and their relevance for water decisions
10
11 has been less than significant, a phenomenon that could be understood in the
12
13 light of the centralized tradition of Mexican political system. In this sense,
14
15 water management policy shows the difficulties of implementing
16
17 decentralization measures and again, the influence of power relationships on
18
19 water utilities performativity. Local water management requires a
20
21 strengthened federalism, one that allows in practice the conciliation of
22
23 different interests in order to achieve efficiency on the service.
24
25
26
27
28
29

30
31 However, moving from a corporatist network to a federalist model which
32
33 enforces local autonomy and citizen participation is not easy. Mexican
34
35 corporatism is a strong mechanism of social control and in this sense it is
36
37 incompatible with citizens participating moved by their own initiative. There is
38
39 also the problem of representation, a water official in San Luis Potosí
40
41 mentioned that when citizens' organizations need to choose a representative
42
43 they do not have clear mechanisms for his designation: "at the end, they send
44
45 the one who has free time the day of the meetings"¹³. It is worth mentioning
46
47 how participation is included in local water laws. Most of the times, local water
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

55 ¹² Interview with General Director of OAPAS, Naucalpan water utility, during the period 2009-2013.
56 ¹³ Interview with public official of Interapas, the water utility of San Luis Potosí, 2012.

legislation consider social participation mixing citizens and enterprises Table

2 shows the inclusion of participation issues in local water laws.

Table 2				
Participation issue inclusion in local water laws				
State	Does local law include citizen participation?		Does local law include private participation?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Aguascalientes	X		X	
Baja California	X		X	
Baja California Sur	X		X	
Campeche	X		X	
Chiapas	X		X	
Chihuahua		X		X
CdMx		X		X
Coahuila		X		X
Colima	X		X	
Durango	X		X	
Guanajuato	X		X	
Guerrero	X		X	
Hidalgo	X		X	
Jalisco	X		X	
Edo. de Méx.	X		X	
Michoacán	X		X	
Morelos	X		X	
Nayarit	X		X	
Nuevo León	X		X	
Oaxaca	X		X	
Puebla	X		X	
Queretaro		X		X
Quintana Roo	X		X	
San Luis Potosí	X		X	
Sinaloa		X		X
Sonora	X		X	
Tabasco	X		X	
Tamaulipas	X		X	
Tlaxcala		X		X
Veracruz	X		X	
Yucatán		X		X
Zacatecas		X	X	

Source: Local water laws.

Thus, the impact of citizen participation is not well founded since there is not an accurate definition of the term, in local water laws there is no distinction between citizen involvement on water issues and the investments made by private enterprises. Also, the presence of organizations in defense of water has been diverse, and they have not been able to replace the corporatist

1 mechanisms that are institutionalized in Mexico, again an issue of power
2 relationships. As we explained it before, formal institutions can easily change,
3 water laws may include citizen participation very quickly; however, the
4 corporatist mechanisms are strongly institutionalized in Mexican society and
5 their transformation could take several generations. Meanwhile,
6 representation problems and limited citizen participation continue influencing
7 the performativity of water systems. How could the notion of citizenship be
8 enhanced in order to generate effective citizen participation in water issues?
9 How could the representation mechanisms be improved in order to integrate
10 a variety of actors and interests? Are the power relationships between
11 participants on water sector changing in this direction?

- 27
28
29
30
31 4. The next socio-political factor is **the political use of information concerning**
32 **water issues**. Information is a key element in order to enhance citizen
33 participation, but data about water availability, water utilities performance,
34 bidding process or the bargaining of concession contracts is not open to the
35 public. Also, different public offices related to water issues use to work with
36 different indexes and different criteria to collect information. In order to have
37 an effective participation, citizens need to know the real situation of water
38 resources. Which is the particular water issue of the municipality or the
39 community? Is it scarcity? Distribution? Water quality? The answer to these
40 questions is also related to transparency and accountability issues,
41 particularly in case of a decision such as a concession contract with a private
42 enterprise. However nor transparency neither accountability have been major

1 mechanisms that are institutionalized in Mexico, again an issue of power
2 relationships. As we explained it before, formal institutions can easily change,
3 water laws may include citizen participation very quickly; however, the
4 corporatist mechanisms are strongly institutionalized in Mexican society and
5 their transformation could take several generations. Meanwhile,
6 representation problems and limited citizen participation continue influencing
7 the performativity of water systems. How could the notion of citizenship be
8 enhanced in order to generate effective citizen participation in water issues?
9 How could the representation mechanisms be improved in order to integrate
10 a variety of actors and interests? Are the power relationships between
11 participants on water sector changing in this direction?
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

- 31 4. The next socio-political factor is **the political use of information concerning**
32 **water issues**. Information is a key element in order to enhance citizen
33 participation, but data about water availability, water utilities performance,
34 bidding process or the bargaining of concession contracts is not open to the
35 public. Also, different public offices related to water issues use to work with
36 different indexes and different criteria to collect information. In order to have
37 an effective participation, citizens need to know the real situation of water
38 resources. Which is the particular water issue of the municipality or the
39 community? Is it scarcity? Distribution? Water quality? The answer to these
40 questions is also related to transparency and accountability issues,
41 particularly in case of a decision such as a concession contract with a private
42 enterprise. However nor transparency neither accountability have been major
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 features of the relationship between state and society in Mexico, with different
4
5 degrees at each policy arena, it has been based on the authority of
6
7 government over citizens. Consequently, information is mainly used in order
8
9 to justify decisions such as increase of water rates or water cuts. It is an
10
11 expression of a power relationship.
12
13

14
15
16
17 Water utilities do not have unified information systems, some of them do not
18
19 even have an information system since not all the local laws establish the
20
21 obligation of creating one. This is a significant problem when we consider that
22
23 most of the water utilities have serious difficulties to maintain an actualized
24
25 user registry. The General Director of ODAPAS pointed out that: "a deficient
26
27 user registry has enforced a clandestine connection to the service and
28
29 increased corruption related to it, which is a big problem for all water
30
31 utilities"¹⁴.
32
33

34
35
36
37 It is also important to say that the creation of information systems would
38
39 contribute to control the influence of political interest over the performativity
40
41 of water utilities, since the decision of sharing information with new water
42
43 servers would not depend on the political will of the precedent administration.
44
45 This is also an important element for the continuity of policy measures or
46
47 programs. Recommendations about the necessity of this information systems
48
49 for improving the commercial efficiency of water utilities have been included
50
51
52
53
54
55

56
57 ¹⁴ Interview with General Director of OAPAS, Naucalpan water utility, during the period 2009-2012.

on the Program for the Modernization of Water Utilities (2008). Table 3 shows how the information systems issue has been included in local water laws.

Table 3
Information systems inclusion in local water laws

State	Is the figure of information system included in local water law?		
	Yes	No	Local level
Aguascalientes		x	
Baja California	x		State
Baja California Sur	x		State
Campeche	x		State
Chiapas	x		State
Chihuahua	x		State
CdMx			
Coahuila			
Colima	x		State
Durango	x		State
Guanajuato		x	
Guerrero	x		State
Hidalgo		x	
Jalisco	x		State
Edo. de Méx.		x	
Michoacán	x		State
Morelos		x	
Nayarit		x	
Nuevo León		x	
Oaxaca	x		State
Puebla	x		State
Querétaro		x	
Quintana Roo		x	
San Luis Potosí		x	
Sinaloa		x	
Sonora	x		State
Tabasco		x	
Tamaulipas	x		State
Tlaxcala	x		State
Veracruz	x		State
Yucatán		x	
Zacatecas		x	

Source: Local water laws.

We can observe that only 16 states include the figure of an information system in its water legislation, however the system is contemplated as part of the state government. There is no intention of requiring the creation of an information system for water utilities, we consider that this is a failure of local

1
2
3 legislation since water utilities could benefit of an information system to
4 improve their performance. It is also an evidence showing that
5 decentralization on the water sector has not reached the municipal level.
6
7
8
9

10
11
12 The relationship between power and information has been largely recognized
13 in Political Science, so it is not surprising to find out that information has
14 played a relevant role in water becoming a political resource which
15 management is based on power relationships. At the same time, information
16 plays a key role in constructing a participative citizenship, so its use reflects
17 the state of the relationship between state and society, the level of trust or
18 distrust between them. We consider that the use of information in local water
19 systems reflect the subject political culture that prevail in Mexican society,
20 users are not seen as citizens having the right to access information, but as
21 subordinates that only deserve the information that the authorities decide to
22 grant them. How can such a power relationship be modified? How could
23 citizens adopt a different role when participating in water issues?
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

- 42 5. Another relevant socio-political issue in Mexican water management is the
43 **difficulty for constructing consensus** between different political actors. It
44 is related to a limited bargaining capacity of governmental actors and an
45 incipient participative culture on Mexican society. These difficulties are more
46 significant when we find different political parties at the three levels of
47 government. Political plurality has increased in Mexico since the last decade
48 of the 20th century, consequently this situation appears more and more on
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 the political scenario. The clientelistic and paternalistic features of Mexican
4 political system do not help to develop an open dialogue, a collaborative
5 attitude nor an efficient administrative planning and that is true not only for
6 water issues but for several dimensions of public affairs. We can once again
7 observe the interweaving between power relationships and organization
8 performativity. Water investments and local water law reforms have been
9 affected by political struggles, thus influencing water utilities performativity.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21 The city of Aguascalientes is a clear example of how political interests and
22 power relationships have interfered water local management. Being the first
23 city with a concession contract for a private firm concerning urban water, it is
24 a wide documented case, particularly the critical moment when the major tried
25 to recover the control over the water system from the hands of the private
26 enterprise. That crisis was also a result of the partisan competition, since it
27 was a major of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, in Spanish) who
28 signed the concession under state and federal governments of the same
29 party, and it was a National Action Party (PAN, in Spanish) major who tried to
30 take back the concession contract. In fact, the promise of remunicipalization
31 of water supply was an important issue during the electoral campaign of this
32 major, who finally was not able to accomplish this goal. We can see that
33 privatization was not a result of a debate searching for the best management
34 option, but it was a decision taken by the federal government an imposition
35 for local governments made possible by power relationships.
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Also, the concession contract granted to the enterprise called Aguakan in the touristic zone of Cancún-Isla Mujeres has been criticized since the Mexican enterprise associated with the concession (Mexican development group) is owned by the Ballesteros family, well known by their political relationships with the local economic elite. In order to have more efficient local water supply systems it is important to overcome the political differences between governmental levels and also to incorporate new non-governmental actors and recognized them as legitimate participants in the policy arena. A major transformation of power relationships prevailing on Mexican water sector is required to facilitate the debate and construction of consensus around relevant issues. Those are with no doubt political issues related to power.

After reviewing the socio-political elements relevant for local water management in Mexico, we synthesize them and their relationships in Figure 4. Normal arrows show one-direction influence, two head arrows show an influence in both senses.

[Insert Figure 4]

We identify the sponsorship relationships, corporatism, clientelism and the difficult in constructing consensus as main derivations of Mexican political culture with important consequences for the performativity of local water systems. We consider that the lack of negotiation capacities results at the same time from Mexican political culture and from the sponsorship relationships strongly embedded on it. Those

political elements affect at least two major technical-management issues discussed on this paper: the appointment of water utilities general directors and the definition of water rates. Concerning the socio-political elements of local water management, we observe citizen participation affected by corporatism, clientelism and the political use of information about water issues. Also, in the general context of Mexican society, we have the notion of water determining water policy and reflected on the National Waters Law. It is worth mentioning that the appointment of water utilities general directors and the definition of water rates are internal issues for each local water system. Finally, citizen participation, the political use of information and the National Waters Law appear in the borderline between local water systems and the Mexican society, since they are elements related to social values and customs.

FINAL REMARKS: WATER AS A POLITICAL RESSOURCE

For the last decade of the 20th century, given the relevance of concession contracts all around the world, water management debate turned around its definition as a public good or as a commodity. The choice between these two concepts was based on the debate between the market and the State as the two competing regimes for allocating resources, in defining which of them was the prevailing resource distributor, we would be establishing how water service should be supplied.

However through this paper we have argued that, in Mexico, water is not seen as a public resource nor as an economic commodity. Furthermore, even if it has been

officially recognized as a human right, water is seen and treated as a political resource strongly influenced by power relationships. Water is a vital resource for human beings and a key resource for economic development, so decisions concerning its use have a significant social impact. We can easily find examples of public officials in all governmental scales having used their positions with political purposes, making difficult to have an efficient performativity of local water systems. As it was previously mentioned in the introduction of this paper, this political use of the resource goes against the recognition of water as a human right and also against an efficient and sustainable management model for water utilities.

In this new scenario, the challenge for Mexican society is to be able to demand governmental actors to overcome the interpretation of water as a political resource and move toward a vision of water corresponding to its definition as human right. Even if public policies could not be neutral, it is possible and necessary to put aside partisan interests surrounding water management. A different power relationships framework is required to improve the performativity of water utilities. A real recognition of the resource as a human right is a first step, but it could be not enough if it is not accompanied by measures enforcing citizen participation in water policy. This is a clear example of incompatibility of institutions, since the formal notion has already changed with the constitutional reform, however the notion of water that prevails in the mind of the actors participating on water management makes part of a social conception that will not change easily.

A first step on this direction would be to facilitate citizens' involvement on local water systems. In a very concrete way, an important measure is to generate or improve information channels in order to facilitate interactions between governmental and non-governmental actors and, at the same time, in order to reduce uncertainty concerning the real situation of hydric resources in each community. Another relevant issue is to establish clear requirements for each position on public offices related to water management, water local systems will not improve their performativity if those positions are still granted on the base of personal relationships or political interests that is, on the base of power. New mechanisms for citizen participation are also needed, different from the distorted corporatist model that has characterized Mexican political system to limit the use of water as an element of political exchange. Concerning the definition of water rates, it would be relevant to integrate advice from academic experts to establish clear criteria in the categorization of users and also the amounts to be charged. Finally, key decisions such as negotiation of water resources, the appointment of general directors of water utilities or the decision of granting a concession contract for water supply should be clarified and treated with transparency. Political use of water should be sanctioned or at least be discouraged through a new institutional design. We have observed that some progress has been made, for example about the inclusion of information systems on local water laws, but such measures need to be better articulated. Once again, we recognized that this is not the unique solution given the fact that a change on formal institutions cannot immediately transform informal institutions as social practices, but it constitutes an initial change.

1
2
3
4
5
6 It would be necessary to explore policy measures conceived to constraint the
7 influence of political parties in water management and, at the same time, oriented to
8 enforce citizenship in order to construct an effective public action for water issues.
9
10 As we pointed out before, it has to do with a transformation of power relationships
11 between governmental and non-governmental actors involved with water
12 management. While these conditions are not accomplished, water will continue to
13 be treated as a political resource subject to power relationships, and not as a human
14 right, no matter what the official speech says. This misconception of water as a
15 political resource not only goes against efficiency, but also against a sustainable use
16 of the resource, making worse the water crisis that has already begun in Mexico¹⁵.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 However, being a vital element, public interest on water issues has increased and
34 crisis could lead to a greater citizen participation. We consider that Mexico is going
35 through a critical moment, since current decisions will define if future arrangements
36 will contribute to collaboration or if they will worsen the conflict between users. Since
37 political and power related elements cannot be completely removed, as we pointed
38 out before, it is important to generate an open deliberation between the
39 governmental and the social spheres, to recover the essence of politics as a
40 mechanism of conciliation of divergent social interests. That means a different power
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

54 ¹⁵ There are several examples on this matter, such as the Mazahuas movement around the Cutzamala system
55 which provides water for Mexico City or the conflict around the Zapotillo damn involving two states. A large
56 literature exists already about this cases.
57

relationships framework, given the interweaving between politics and performativity of water systems that has been illustrated on this paper. Is in this sense that we consider water management as an example of how Mexican political culture is moving from a subject model to a participant one, and all the challenges that this transformation implies.

Constructing a pluralistic culture goes against the essential features of Mexican political system, but it would not be the first time in history that political powers are constraint to make some concessions in order to survive and keep their dominant position. As we stated in the introduction of this paper, environmental issues are auspicious political arenas to boost this transition. The main challenge is to conciliate the multiple tensions generated by the different change rhythms of formal and informal institutions affecting water management. Even more considering that these tensions adopt different expressions on different local systems.

REFERENCES

- Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba (1989). *The civic culture. Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*, Sage publications.
- Cabrero Mendoza, Enrique (2005). *Acción pública y desarrollo local*, FCE, México.
- Conagua, Banobras (2008) *Programa para la modernización de los organismos operadores de agua*, México.

Figure 1
Institutional structure of Mexican water sector before decentralization




Figure 2
Institutional structure of water sector after decentralization
San Luis Potosí




Figure 3
Institutional structure of water sector after decentralization
Aguascalientes





Figure 4
Socio-political elements influencing local water management in Mexico



ANEXO 2

consulta sobre financiamiento para estancia

E: mensaje

Ma. de Lourdes Amaya Ventura <lourdes.amaya70@gmail.com>
Para: César Octavio Vargas Téllez <cvargas@correo.cua.uam.mx>

21 de febrero de 2019, 19:51

Estimado César,

Te escribo con referencia a la solicitud de financiamiento que te he comentado. Ya no pudo concretarse la estancia en Francia para trabajar con la oficina de la UAM allá en Toulouse, en parte debido a la huelga. Pero he avanzado en gestiones para la estancia en el CIDE Aguascalientes o la Universidad de Guanajuato sede León. Hay acuerdos para trabajar con colegas de ambas instituciones, por definir cuál sería la sede o si pasaría la mitad de la estancia en cada una de ellas.

Para avanzar en las pláticas, quiero consultarte si sería posible contar con los \$31,500.00 que presupuesté en mi plan de trabajo para cubrir boleto y viáticos de dicha estancia.

Estoy consciente de que nos encontramos en proceso de huelga, pero requiero hacerte esta consulta por los tiempos de gestión que manejan ambas instituciones.

Todo comentario resulta de utilidad.
Gracias y saludos,

Dra. Ma. de Lourdes Amaya Ventura
UAM Cuajimalpa
Departamento de Estudios Institucionales (DEIIN)

ANEXO 3



visita León y Aguascalientes

Alex Ricardo Caldera Ortega <arcaldera@gmail.com>

Para: "Ma. de Lourdes Amaya Ventura" <lourdes.amaya70@gmail.com>

Cc: José Jaime Sainz Santamaría <jaime.sainz@cide.edu>, Raúl Pacheco-Vega <raul.pacheco-vega@cide.edu>

Estimada Lulú, tu estancia en León la cubre la Universidad de Guanajuato. Cuenta con ello. Mañana me pongo en contacto contigo. Saludos.

[El texto citado está oculto]

ANEXO 4



Ma. de Lourdes Amaya Ventura <lourdes.amaya70@gmail.com>

visita León y Aguascalientes

José Jaime Sainz Santamaría <jaime.sainz@cide.edu>

26 de abril de 2019, 14:01

Para: "Ma. de Lourdes Amaya Ventura" <lourdes.amaya70@gmail.com>, Alex Ricardo Caldera Ortega <arcaldera@gmail.com>

Cc: Raúl Pacheco-Vega <raul.pacheco-vega@cide.edu>

Hola Lulú,

Por nuestra parte, con gusto también podremos apoyar al menos parcialmente tu estancia en Aguascalientes. El lunes, que regresamos a actividades administrativas regulares, te doy los detalles.

Saludos,

Jaime.

El Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE)
en su sede Región Centro, a través del Proyecto
"Entendiendo y Resolviendo Conflictos por el Agua
en México" le invitan cordialmente al

TALLER

Hacia una agenda sobre la investigación social del agua en la región Centro-Occidente

Lourdes Amaya

Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana

Esteban Castro

Newcastle University

Alex Caldera

Universidad de Guanajuato

Richard Woodward

Texas A&M University

Peter Knappett


Texas A&M University

Lunes 20 de mayo de 2019
Sala de Juntas 2 (matutino) y
Sala de Juntas 3 (vespertino)
CIDE-Región Centro

Circuito Tecnopolo Norte 117, Tecnopolo Pocitos II,
Aguascalientes, Ags.

INVITACIÓN

ANEXO 5



Comentan:

Dra. Adriana Aguilar, Centro Geo

Dr. Jaime Sainz, CIDE Región Centro

Dr. Osiel González, CIDE Región Centro





El Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C.

Otorga la presente constancia a:


Dra. Ma. de Lourdes Amaya Ventura

Por haber participado en el taller


***Hacia una agenda sobre la investigación social del agua
en la región Centro-Occidente***

El día 20 de mayo de 2019 en las instalaciones del Centro de Investigación
y Docencia Económicas, Región Centro, en el marco del proyecto Conacyt 1734
*Entendiendo y resolviendo conflictos por el Agua en México: Elementos de gobernanza y
propuestas de política pública.*

Aguascalientes, Ags., a 23 de mayo de 2019.



Dr. José Jaime Sainz Santamaría
Director Sede Región Centro



Dr. Raúl Pacheco-Vega
Responsable técnico

Circuito Tecnopolo Norte s/n, Parque Industrial Tecnopolo II
Comunidad Hacienda Nueva, Del. Pocitos. 20313 Aguascalientes, Ags. México
(449) 994 5150
www.cide.edu

El Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE)
en su sede Región Centro, a través del Proyecto
"Entendiendo y Resolviendo Conflictos Por el Agua en
México" le invitan cordialmente a la

CHARLA

Politics and policy in Mexican water management

Lourdes Amaya
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana


Jueves **23** de mayo de 2019
11:00 am

Sala de Juntas 2
CIDE-Región Centro

Circuito Tecnopolo Norte 117, Tecnopolo Pocitos II,
Aguascalientes, Ags.

INVITACIÓN

ANEXO 7



Comentan:

Dra. Adriana Aguilar, *Centro Geo*

Dr. Jaime Sainz, *CIDE Región Centro*

Dr. Raúl Pacheco-Vega, *CIDE Región Centro*



El Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C.

Otorga la presente constancia a:


Dra. Ma. de Lourdes Amaya Ventura

Por haber impartido la charla


***Politics and policy in
Mexican water management***

El día 23 de mayo de 2019 en las instalaciones del Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Región Centro, en el marco del proyecto Conacyt 1734 *Entendiendo y resolviendo conflictos por el Agua en México: Elementos de gobernanza y propuestas de política pública.*

Aguascalientes, Ags., a 23 de mayo de 2019.



Dr. José Jaime Sainz Santamaría
Director Sede Región Centro



Dr. Raúl Pacheco-Vega
Responsable técnico



Home



Explore



Notifications



Messages



Bookmarks



Lists



Profile



More

Tweet



Thread



Dr Raul Pacheco-Vega
@raulpacheco

En seminario de la Dra Lourdes Amaya Ventura @uamcuajimalpa sobre agua y política hídrica en México. Apoyado con recursos del proyecto Problemas Nacionales "Entendiendo Conflictos por el Agua en México". Agradecemos el apoyo de CONACYT para su ejecución. @MaeaCide @CIDE_MX

Translate Tweet



11:11 AM · May 23, 2019 from CIDE Region Centro · Twitter for iPhone

1 Retweet 3 Likes



Dr Raul Pacheco-Vega @raulpacheco · May 23

En diálogo directo con el trabajo de la Dra. Amaya Ventura tengo un artículo sobre la gobernanza intermunicipal del agua en Aguascalientes, Jesús María y San Francisco de los Romos researchgate.net/publication/27... y la posibilidad de nuevo arreglo institucional coordinado intermunicipal



(PDF) "Intermunicipalidad como un Arreglo Institucio...
PDF | On Jan 1, 2014, Raul Pacheco-Vega and others
published "Intermunicipalidad como un Arreglo ...
researchgate.net



1



Dr Raul Pacheco-Vega @raulpacheco · May 23

Pueden acceder más trabajos de la Dra. Amaya Ventura aquí:



Ma. de Lourdes Amaya Ventura's research works | M...
Ma. de Lourdes Amaya Ventura's 6 research works
with 11 citations and 124 reads, including: Aspectos ...
researchgate.net

UNIVERSIDAD DE
GUANAJUATO

ANEXO 10



La Universidad de Guanajuato
otorga la presente

CONSTANCIA

A
LOURDES AMAYA

Por su participación en la mesa:
Desigualdades en el acceso al agua (urbana y rural)

En el marco del Coloquio Retos sociopolíticos de la gestión del agua ante modelos de desarrollo extractivistas
en México y América Latina

León, Gto. 17 de mayo de 2019


Dr. Alex Ricardo Caldera Ortega
Director

División de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades
Campus León

DIVISIÓN DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES Y HUMANIDADES